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The ongoing discussion about the Constitutional Tribunal (CT) in recent 
weeks and the developments involving it show what an important position the 
CT has in Poland’s political system. It breeds a temptation to bring the CT 
under the control of political forces or at least to diminish its ability to review 
legislation. For the most important task of the CT is to act as guardian so that 
norms arising from State organs be consistent with the Constitution. The very 
notion of guardianship in the maintenance of this consistency should be an 
unquestioned canon in any democratic State ruled by law despite the fact that 
it often hinders the work of the legislative and executive powers. As a rule, 
this causes their aversion to the CT. This aversion—however understand-
able—should not weaken the mechanism ensuring that no public authority 
changes into an ‘autocracy’—an authoritarian regime threatening the rise of 
a dictatorship. It is better, therefore, not to treat such threats lightly, even if 
they initially appear unreal or non-existent. History, in this regard, supplies 
many tragic examples. 
In democratic States, nobody questions as a rule the fact that constitu-
tional courts are the institutions in which the sole power to review the consti-
tutionality of laws is vested. In other States—in which history has taken a dif-
ferent course—this power rests with supreme courts (as in the United States 
of America). The importance of these institutions for the political system de-
mands that considerable restraint be exercised when amending the laws that 
concern them. Any such changes should come as absolute exceptions and have 
very serious (and justifiable) motives behind them. 
Three such motives can be named. First, the need for amendments could 
follow from the assumption that constitutional norms are so flawed that they 
do not deserve to be respected because they contravene the ‘will of the People’ 
and do not meet the standards of the democratic State ruled by law. Hence, 
such norms should not be upheld by the CT. In the Polish reality, this argu-
ment may seem outlandish, but allusions to the primacy of the ‘good of the 
People’ have appeared recently even in parliamentary speeches. Second, a mo-
tive for amendments could be derived from allegations that the CT improperly 
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reviews laws. Third, any amendments to improve the work of the CT are al-
ways welcome. Any such amendments, however, must not undermine its posi-
tion in the political system and autonomy, as well as independence of justices. 
Against this background, it is worthwhile to examine in greater detail the 
amendments to the Constitutional Tribunal Act (CT Act) discussed now and, 
specifically, discern if they have been prompted by the motives mentioned 
above. 
History knows many examples of entire systems of law, including consti-
tutions, being deservedly referred to—in the words of Rudolf Stammler—as 
‘wicked law’, not deserving any respect. Those who had broken such law had 
later monuments erected and were treated as heroes. This is also true for Po-
land’s modern history. However, for over a quarter of a century, the situation 
has been radically different. The Polish 1997 Constitution, in spite of flaws 
in need of correction or even some regulations begging redrafting, meets all 
the fundamental standards of the democratic State ruled by law and deserves 
protection. Even its harshest critics do not call for its boycott. Hence, neither 
authoritative legal literature nor any responsible political force officially al-
leges that the CT protects a bad Constitution. 
In this situation, it is opportune to discuss the second motive and ponder 
if the CT properly protects constitutional norms. The discussion of the recent 
amendments to the law concerning the CT (Act of 22 December 2015 to amend 
the CT Act) has centred on the manner of appointing justices. The author of 
these amendments argued that a majority of the current justices had been 
chosen during the term of political forces that had dominated and which sub-
sequently had lost the last election. This is true. This is the law in force now 
and the current parliamentary majority does not gainsay its adherence either. 
Therefore, bringing this sort of argument is neither rational nor fair. For one 
cannot question the legitimacy of choosing justices by one parliamentary ma-
jority and at the same time consider the choice made by another majority as 
valid. 
Neither is the argument persuading that the need of amendments follows 
from the breaking of the rule that deputies choose CT justices only to replace 
those justices whose terms of office end during the lifetime of the Sejm mak-
ing the choice. This rule was broken by the legislation passed by the previous 
Sejm and the choice of two additional justices in advance (beyond the term 
of the existing parliament), despite the fact that they should have been cho-
sen by the next Sejm. The CT not only did not participate in this, but quite 
on the contrary, held that in this respect the amendment to the statute was 
unconstitutional as was the choice of those two justices. Whereas, the choice 
of the three other justices was held to have been lawful—whereby the consti-
tutional order was restored. It is, therefore, surprising that this situation is 
cited as one of the reasons making it absolutely necessary to ‘mend’ the way 
the CT works. Incidentally, what else makes one wonder is the allegations 
made against several justices that they took part in preparing unconstitu-
tional amendments to the CT Act. If this had been true, the CT would not 
have held the amendments, which allegedly were co-authored by its justices, 
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unconstitutional. This is a clear case of confusing law-making with desirable 
consultations with entities which a new law is to affect. 
The chief problem follows, however, from the explicitly formulated sug-
gestion that justices chosen on the recommendation of the previous parlia-
mentary majority do not guarantee impartiality: may be guided by party loy-
alty when giving their opinions. With the current system of choosing justices, 
similar allegations could be made against the justices who have sat on all the 
adjudicating benches until now. The justices recommended by the political 
faction making this kind of allegation would not be spared. Of course, it can-
not be ruled out that a justice will compromise his or her professional integrity 
and obediently meet the expectations of the party that has recommended him. 
This would be a very serious allegation, disqualifying to a justice, which would 
need to be proven and verified in a disciplinary procedure provided for such 
situations. Whereas, making such unfounded and generalising allegations is 
unacceptable not only because of political culture, but also in terms of common 
decency and ethical requirements. This is, of course, not to preclude a discus-
sion of other ways of choosing CT justices. 
The above reflections are based on personal experience. I was appointed 
a justice of the CT soon after Poland regained her freedom in 1989. The CT 
was comprised then of 12 justices appointed by both the old regime and the 
new authorities. I was afraid of a political confrontation and clash of outlook 
among them. Indeed, heated discussions did take place. However, they con-
cerned points of law. Everyone tried to stay within the bounds of a civilised 
dialogue. The confidentiality of bench deliberations prevents me from disclos-
ing any details or even much less, divulging any names. The main criterion of 
evaluation of our work after all should be the quality of CT decisions, which 
do not give rise as a rule to any serious censure in the authoritative legal lit-
erature. The decisions of the Polish CT were closely followed from the begin-
ning in other democratic States ruled by law. As a result, it quickly joined the 
prestigious club of German, French, Italian or Spanish constitutional courts. 
This could be seen in many direct contacts between these courts from various 
States, but does not mean, however, that all its judgments are faultless and 
may not be criticised. Nonetheless, there are no grounds whatsoever for mak-
ing blanket allegations of partiality. 
In the period I am writing about, most justices were aware of the histori-
cally exceptional times they worked in. For the most part, old law was still in 
force, while the Constitution—albeit slightly modified—dated back to 1952. In 
the Polish People’s Republic, law was treated as an instrument for protecting 
the then political system. Meanwhile, the CT was meant as a guarantor of 
the democratic system. This contradiction gave rise to highly complex legal 
situations. One of them was the notorious crisis provoked by the oath formula 
which several newly elected justices were unwilling to take. Most importantly, 
however, the CT, despite varied political views and differences in outlook, was 
able to unravel many extremely complex cases in jure. This is particularly 
true of fundamental axiological cases, which brought out strong emotions 
and aroused fierce controversies. In this context, suffice to mention decisions 
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concerning the return of teaching religion at schools, displaying crosses in 
public places, several decisions concerning the protection of human life and 
others concerning property, following from old decisions nationalising pri-
vate property. A review of all successive CT decisions would not produce any 
evidence that justices have not been impartial. Every decision in its essence 
affects some vested political interests. Sometimes it pleases a parliamentary 
majority and on other occasions it may prove very painful. The latter situa-
tion arises when the CT rules a piece of legislation originally sponsored by 
the parliamentary majority unconstitutional. Usually, opposition factions 
receive such rulings with opposite feelings. It can be easily shown that it has 
never been the case that CT decisions were always favourable to one faction 
and unfavourable to another. Hence, an allegation of partiality in regard 
to CT justices is unfounded even more so as these are mostly outstanding 
jurists (who have their political convictions and outlook) but when they take 
their seats on the CT, they try to stay objective and act honestly so that their 
standing with their colleagues and peers does not suffer. Moreover, since 
a justice can serve only one term on the bench, there is no temptation to bow 
down to the expectations of the political forces that recommended the justice 
to a seat on the CT. 
So the spurious and ungrounded argument of partiality is to make it sup-
posedly necessary to amend the CT Act. Furthermore, it is unfounded or down-
right ridiculous to claim that the CT in its current composition will block any 
reforms attempted by the new authorities who, after all, will successively get 
their chance to appoint new justices. Hence, there is no need—at least for this 
reason—to introduce any violent, revolutionary amendments to the CT Act. 
Finally, a thought ought to be given to the need to improve the work of the 
CT in a way provided for in the recent act to amend the CT Act of 22 Decem-
ber 2015 (the third potential motive to introduce amendments mentioned in 
the beginning). Only organisational matters and proceedings before the CT 
can be meant as it is only these domains that the Constitution in its Article 
197 leaves to be regulated by statute. This clause of the Constitution bars the 
legislature from encroaching on the territory reserved for the CT’s judicial ac-
tivity and restricting ist ability to adjudicate (Article 188 of the Constitution). 
No one has any doubts that the latest act to amend the CT Act may be sub-
jected—as any other act—to judicial review by the CT. The Constitution does 
not provide for any exceptions in this respect. Leaving aside what the decision 
of the CT in this case will be, in particular what judgment will be entered, 
it is worthwhile to scrutinise several provisions of the amending act, which 
are marked by a curious paradox. They include a rule that the CT should sit 
in a division of 13 justices and hear cases in the order of their submission. 
Another objection that the amending act gives rise to is its failure to provide 
for a vacatio legis. Paradoxically, these three provisions not only do not im-
prove the organisation of work of, and proceedings before, the CT, but—if they 
were applied—paralyse its adjudicating activity. This means that—contrary 
to appearances—the December amending act encroaches on the powers of the 
CT for the only and direct source of these powers should be the Constitution. 
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Actually, the three provisions form a triple obstacle, preventing the CT from 
properly performing its functions. 
The requirement that the CT sit in a division of 13 justices totally blocks 
adjudication on the constitutionality of statutes, including of course the new 
CT Act, because there are currently fewer justices on the CT capable of adjudi-
cation. This matter constitutes a separate constitutional issue that was deter-
mined in the binding CT judgment of 3 December 2015. If, therefore, the CT 
considered itself bound by this provision, it would have to cease adjudicating. 
If, however, the CT president additionally admitted three justices out of those 
sworn into office by the president, he would defy the CT judgment of 3 Decem-
ber 2015. This is so because these three justices were chosen despite the fact 
that—as the CT held in the above-named judgment—their seats had already 
been lawfully filled by the previous Sejm. The legislature has thus brought 
about an absurd situation that places in jeopardy the functioning of the CT. 
In turn, the provision making the CT hear cases in order of their submis-
sion poses another obstacle to reviewing, within a reasonable time, the con-
stitutionality of the new CT Act. The CT would not be able to adjudicate on 
this matter even if it were possible to solve the quorum problem. As the mat-
ter concerns a piece of legislation dated 22 December 2015, it would have to 
wait to be heard until proceedings in all earlier cases have ended. When this 
would happen is hard to tell. A Catch-22 situation could develop where all CT 
judgments rendered in this time would be tainted by unconstitutionality if it 
turned out later that the act, pursuant to which they were entered, was uncon-
stitutional. Therefore, in agreement with logic, petitions to have the constitu-
tionality of the CT Act reviewed should be considered first. Another question 
is the irrationality of imposing the order of hearing cases by statute. 
The failure to provide a vacatio legis for the act amending the CT Act is the 
third element ‘protecting’ it against being reviewed by the CT within a rea-
sonable period of time. Publishing the amending act forthwith (within hours 
from its signing by the president) made the first two obstacles—paralysing 
the work of the CT—come into force without delay. It looks as if the authors 
of the amending act were afraid that the CT could consider the question of its 
constitutionality during a vacatio legis. 
We do not know the real, far-reaching motives of such rash amendments to 
the CT Act passed in a manner that is not generally practised in democratic 
States. One can only guess. The matter is not helped by the reasons for these 
moves given by the authors of the amendments. For instance, nothing is ex-
plained by their answers to frequent inquiries by both domestic and important 
foreign institutions or organisations. In most cases, their answers are nothing 
but indications of pathological phenomena taking place when their predeces-
sors were in power or historical events, going as far back as the period of the 
Partitions or the Second World War. Occasionally, there is also advice as to 
what the inquirer should busy himself with instead. Furthermore, allegations 
are made, known from not so distant a past, of a ‘conspiracy of hostile forces’ 
or corporate interests being upset and the like. Another claim which can be 
heard is that the new authorities elected in a democratic election represent 
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the ‘will of the People’, while the same characteristic is denied to other politi-
cal forces assuming government in previous elections. Such explanations not 
only clarify little, but also raise even more doubts and give the impression of 
a desire to hide the true intentions of those wielding power. 
Meanwhile, the recent developments involving the CT may engender se-
rious concern as to the future of the democratic State ruled by law. These 
concerns are exacerbated by the context of events in many other areas, which 
call for separate analyses. It is no accident that the situation under discussion 
has attracted attention and criticism from many serious law centres in Poland 
and many major foreign opinion-forming media and international political in-
stitutions. It is highly improbable that all expressing such concern are wrong, 
ill-intentioned or involved in non-existent, imaginary situations. In Poland’s 
true interest, the matter must not be treated lightly. It may be resolved with 
the help of the CT. For this to happen, the CT must be allowed to perform its 
principal functions even if this were to hinder the achievement of particular 
aims of some political factions in power. For there is no guarantee that these 
aims are, or will be, identical with the true common good. 
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The Amendment to the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal passed on 22 December 2015 has 
raised serious doubts in Polish and foreign academic and political institutions and the media. Of 
particular concern is the fact that the amendment does not correspond to the limitations of Ar-
ticle 197 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Contrary to appearances the amendment 
exceeds organisational and procedural questions. The amendment imposing a rule that 13 judges 
must rule on cases in the chronological order of their submission and the lack of vacatio legis 
makes it impossible for the Constitutional Tribunal to continue in practice its normal judicial 
function. In particular it makes it impossible for the Constitutional Tribunal to decide on the con-
stitutional legality of the Amendment of 22 December 2015 within a reasonable time scale which 
in itself could result in dangerous and absurd legal situations. This could be tantamount to an 
interference in the judicial competences of the Constitutional Tribunal guaranteed by Article 188 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. It is the Constitutional Tribunal itself that should 
rule on all dilemmas concerning this amendment.
